director of national intelligence


  • Incenting the Intelligence Community to Collaborate

    Instilling collaborative organizational culture often requires changing the recognition and reward system. But internally-competitive entrenched interests will undoubtedly resist changes to how the organization pays and promotes people. Also expect resistance from people who believe there’s no reason to incent people, because they should do as they’re told.

     

    James Clapper Tuesday, during James Clapper’s confirmation hearing as director of national intelligence, Senator Carl Levin (D-Michigan) asked Clapper why it’s necessary to incent the intelligence community to collaborate. Levin was referring to Clapper’s pre-hearing questionnaire in which he apparently wrote that, if confirmed, he would achieve progress in information sharing by the “disciplined application” of incentives—both rewards and consequences. “Why do we need incentives,” Levin asked “Why don’t we just need a directive from the President by executive order, for instance? Otherwise, why do we need incentives, rewards and consequences?”

     

    Clapper responded, “One way of inducing change in culture is to provide rewards for those who collaborate and, I suppose, penalties for those who don’t.” He added, “And obviously directives are effective too.” You can watch Levin’s questions and Clapper’s testimony before the Senate Intelligence Community on C-SPAN here (counter 1:37:06). Incidentally, collaborative organizations achieve more with the carrot than the stick. Penalties for failure to collaborate are anti-collaborative in that they spread fear. Instead, reward and recognize collaborators; then others will get the message and start changing their behavior.

     

    Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the intelligence community has struggled to shift from a culture of competition and information hoarding among agencies to a collaborative culture in which people share data and information. For background on this, see my December 30, 2009 post. I have advised senior leaders of the intelligence community about the transition. On the sixth anniversary of the terrorist attacks, I gave a speech to the community sponsored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

     

    In the speech, I highlighted four areas. One was aligning recognition and reward systems to encourage collaboration. ODNI, the entity formed after September 11, has been driving collaboration among the sixteen agencies that comprise the intelligence community. Some agencies have balked, ostensibly for security reasons, about sharing their data across the community. While security concerns are valid, perceived loss of control and inter-agency rivalry also play a role.

     

    The leaders whom I’ve advised implicitly understand the value of collaboration in developing better intelligence and thwarting terrorists. They also understand institutional resistance. James Clapper currently serves as Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and formerly served as the director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This multi-agency intelligence background gives Clapper an advantage in guiding the shift in the intelligence community’s culture in that an insider committed to change has more credibility than an outsider does. Clapper must draw on his alliances and relationships across the community to help break down barriers among agencies and adopt collaborative culture.  



  • It Takes More Than Sharing Information to Prevent Terrorist Attacks

    More than eight years after lack of collaboration among intelligence agencies contributed to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency is facing new allegations that it failed to share vital information that could have thwarted last week’s attempted bomb attack on Northwest flight 253.  

    ODNI Logo President Obama yesterday scolded the United States Intelligence Community for “a systemic failure” because intelligence agencies apparently never shared all of their information about the suspect before he boarded the plane and was ultimately subdued by passengers. The National Security Agency reportedly had information that Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen were preparing a Nigerian to commit a terrorist attack against the United States. And the Central Intelligence Agency had reportedly met with the father of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab , the suspect, at the U.S. Embassy in Nigeria. The suspect’s father apparently informed the CIA of his son’s radicalization. Had there been greater collaboration among agencies, President Obama has said that the suspect’s name would have appeared on the so-called No Fly List, which likely would have prevented him from boarding the Northwest plane.

     

    According to the lead story in today’s Wall Street Journal, officials of the National Counterterrorism Center which acts as a clearinghouse for terrorism data, have indicated that the CIA failed to share all of its information with other agencies.

     

    The problem is that terrorists are often highly collaborative, but the Intelligence Community has lagged behind in embracing collaboration. The 911 Commission Report recommended a reorganization of the 16-agency Intelligence Community under a Director of National Intelligence. The report also recommended increased information sharing among agencies to thwart future attacks. Subsequently, President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the National Counterterrorism Center, and called for “open-source intelligence.” In 2007, ODNI implemented a 100-day plan and a 500-day plan for Integration and Collaboration among agencies.

     

    As part of the new commitment to collaboration, the Intelligence Community adopted A-Space, modeled after MySpace and Facebook, so that analysts could share information across agencies. The community has also adopted Intellipedia, a cross-agency wiki.

     

    On the sixth anniversary of the terrorist attacks, I gave a speech to the Intelligence Community. The speech was sponsored and hosted by ODNI. In the speech and during subsequent meetings with senior intelligence officials, I insisted that it would take much more than tools and a top-down collaboration initiative for the Intelligence Community to actually collaborate. Our research at The Culture of Collaboration® Institute indicates that in any organization, people may buy into collaboration as a concept, but in practice it’s a totally different story. Therefore, reducing fear of collaboration and changing behavior are crucial to cultural shift.

     

    Clearly, intelligence requires protecting classified information just as corporations must protect trade secrets. But aside from keeping outsiders from obtaining information, many career intelligence officers have been conditioned to embrace secrecy within their community. This fosters information hoarding, intra-agency rivalry and intelligence failures. It takes more than new tools and technologies and more than even an act of Congress to abandon this deeply-engrained conditioning.

     

    Sharing information among agencies is undoubtedly necessary, but thwarting attacks requires much more. Even if agencies make information available to one another, people need to know how to act on that information.  Therefore, I will reiterate here two major points on which I’ve counseled senior intelligence officials:

     

    1) Favor on-the-fly decisions over chain-of-command decisions.

    2) Encourage spontaneous interaction over scheduled encounters and meetings

     

    The White House and intelligence officials can talk ad nauseam about sharing information. If, however, analysts and other intelligence personnel are expected to run decisions “up the flagpole” and are inclined to schedule meetings rather than connect with colleagues and hash out issues on the fly, it will remain difficult to thwart attacks.

     

    As I noted in The Culture of Collaboration book, "the in-box culture is dead." And if asynchronous information sharing persists without the necessary real-time cultural components, intelligence failures will continue. The cultural shift necessary to prevent security lapses like the one aboard Northwest flight 253 involves moving beyond information and data sharing—and embracing real-time collaboration.