General Motors


  • General Motors and the “C” Word

    General Motors CEO Mary Barra is taking aim at the “C” word.

    “I hate the word culture,” Barra is quoted as saying in an article by Joseph B. White in the Mary BarraSeptember 30 edition of the Wall Street Journal. “Culture is really just how we all behave,” according to Barra. The comments are curious in that Barra testified before a Congressional subcommittee last June that she would

    GM CEO Mary Barra outlines new strategic plan  (Image copyright GM)

    not rest until GM’s “deep underlying cultural problems” are resolved. The subcommittee was investigating GM’s failure to recall thousands of cars with defective ignition switches for eleven years.

    It’s myopic to dismiss the word culture. Merriam-Webster Dictionary’s third definition of culture is “a way of thinking, behaving, or working that exists in a place or organization.” GM would benefit from focusing on these issues plus the broader context of the word culture. In his Tusculan Disputations, the ancient Roman orator Cicero introduced the concept of culture as cultivation of the soul as a farmer cultivates crops. Culture has come to represent beliefs and customs of societies. Cultural anthropologists study social structure and customs in populations ranging from villages to corporations.

    Culture is inextricably intertwined with collaboration in that how “we all behave” in Barra’s words determines whether we’re working together towards common goals or working at cross purposes. Ironically, in a July 28, 2014 post, The Culture of Collaboration® blog took General Motors to task for overemphasizing culture change without structural change. Culture change typically delivered as an edict often highlights the desired result without providing a way to get there. This common prescription from leaders, pundits and management gurus often fails, because the shift originates with executives without detail, discussion or broad buy-in. Meantime, the outmoded organizational structure stays the same. To achieve collaborative culture and the payoff that collaboration provides, it’s necessary to change the organizational structure. Then culture change can happen.

    On October 1, GM outlined its new strategic plan that focuses on technology and product advances, growth in China, establishing Cadillac as a separate business unit “headquartered” in New York City and delivering “core operating efficiencies.” Incidentally, the notion of headquarters is a relic of Industrial Age command and control. Nowhere does the plan mention structural change, which the automaker sorely needs. Changing GM’s structure requires overhauling everything from how team members share information across levels, roles and regions to how the company recognizes and rewards people as I detail in my book, The Bounty Effect: 7 Steps to The Culture of Collaboration®.

     

     



  • Fixing General Motors and Curing Veterans Affairs

    General Motors chief executive Mary Barra has vowed to change the company’s culture and has testified
    GM Logo1before Congress that GM has taken steps to increase internal transparency and information sharing. This commitment follows a report exposing that GM discouraged raising or sharing safety concerns. The company commissioned the report, because GM failed to recall thousands of cars with defective ignition switches for eleven years.

    Similar calls for culture change have followed the Veterans Health Administration’s wait-for-care and numbers fudging scandal. President Obama has remarked that VA Image the VA needs a culture change so that “bad news gets surfaced quickly.” Not content to wait for culture change, House and Senate negotiators today announced a $17 billion plan that, among other provisions, provides money to lease clinics so that veterans can get treatment outside the VA’s system.

    Culture change emphasizes the result without a way to get there. It’s like telling a poor person to become rich. Culture change has become a common prescription from leaders, pundits and management gurus. The prescription often fails, because the shift originates with executives without detail, discussion or broad buy-in. Meantime, the organizational structure stays the same.

    The Bounty Effect has hit GM and the VA. As I describe in my new book, The Bounty Effect happens when exigent circumstances compel businesses, government and organizations to change their structures from command-and-control to collaborative. The solution for these organizations is to seize the opportunity The Bounty Effect provides and fundamentally change their structures so that people can spontaneously engage one another, share information and participate in decisions regardless of level, role or region. This will cost far less than $17 billion.

    Many organizations, including GM and the VA, still operate with a structure that has barely changed since the Industrial Age.  This obsolete structure based on command-and-control promotes hierarchy and internal competition plus rewards information hoarding, secrecy, and cutting corners. GM and the VA also share a need to go through channels. This inhibits the participation and information flow critical to Information Age organizations.

    Safety concerns apparently never reached GM’s chief executive, nor did problems with scheduling reporting systems apparently flow to former VA Secretary Eric Shinseki.  And both organizations apparently discouraged people from sharing concerns. VA supervisors often retaliated against workers who raised valid complaints, according to a White House report.

    GM chief executive Mary Barra has said that culture change must be leader-led. Barra has also promoted a program called “speak up for safety” plus three GM “core values.” These are “the customer is our compass, relationships matter, and individual excellence is crucial.” But a leader’s words have modest impact without structural change. Yes, GM has added safety investigators, increased safety data mining, and created a vice president of safety position. Nevertheless, none of these actions will reduce information hoarding and internal competition. None of these actions will change GM’s structure from command-and-control to collaborative. 

    When an organization rewards obsolete behavior, change dies on the vine despite a leader’s mandate. If hoarding and hiding information or failing to act on knowledge results in a raise or a promotion, people are unlikely to share information or take action. Pushing safety issues at GM was seemingly no path to promotion. VA managers reportedly kept patient names off the official waiting list, because bonuses depended on concealing information. Recognition and reward systems in obsolete organizational structures often reinforce bad behavior and the status quo regardless of culture change efforts. The same flawed practices and processes that encourage internal competition and information hoarding lead companies to compromise safety and fudge numbers.

    Changing the VA’s structure will enhance transparency and efficiency while saving money rather than costing the $17 billion Congress is authorizing. Changing GM’s structure will ensure that people across the organization share and act on critical information.  And changing the structure of GM and the VA will accomplish what many leaders and pundits are recommending: culture change.



  • How Bean Counting Compromised Value at General Motors

    Too often companies emphasize numbers over products and forecasting over customers. Such firms typically focus on short-term results over long-term value. This creates greater internal competition and encourages shorter-term supplier relationships rather than enhancing collaboration internally among functions and externally with business partners.

    The relentless focus on numbers at the expense of domain expertise figures prominently in the book, Car Guys vs. Bean Counters (Portfolio, 2011) by Bob Lutz, former vice chairman of General Motors. Fifty years ago, GM products were the epitome of design. Over the last half century, though, the company’s products have steadily lost traction with customers. This decline culminated in the company’s reorganization under Chapter 11 in June of 2009. While many factors contributed to GM’s bankruptcy, short-sighted bean counting was undoubtedly one of them.

    “It’s time to stop the dominance of the number crunchers, living in their perfect, predictable, financially projected world,” writes Bob, who specializes in getting people’s attention. I first encountered Bob early in my career when I was reporting on the auto industry and attending the introduction of the Jeep Grand Cherokee at the 1992 North American International Auto Show in Detroit. Bob exuded machismo as he drove the SUV through a plate-glass window into the hall, shocking me and other journalists awaiting the usual dull presentations. At the time, Bob was president of Chrysler.

    Bob’s detractors consider him an old-school, shoot-from-the-hip executive who makes decisions based on his gut with little analysis. In reality, Bob understands the need for left brain and right brain driven people to collaborate regardless of their titles or functions. And he encourages more junior people to challenge him. In short, he values constructive confrontation, one of the ten cultural elements of collaboration I introduce in my book, The Culture of Collaboration

    The former Marine Corps pilot insists that “car guys” should run auto companies, “supermarket guys” should run supermarkets, and “software guys” should run software companies. He concedes that these “guys” can be of either sex. Too often, as I noted in The Culture of Collaboration book, boards of directors and senior leaders believe that if they hire “star players” these supposed stars can and will achieve results regardless of their domain knowledge or industry experience. Some prominent management consulting firms reinforce this skewed logic. The so-called star players are typically numbers-driven MBA’s interested more in units rather than in products and in forecasting rather than in customers. The organization promotes these internally-competitive numbers crunchers and sidelines others who focus on improving products and interacting with customers.

    Of course, quantitative analysis is critical to any business. The problem arises when quantitative analysis dominates and pervades every aspect of a business while designing awesome products and creating market stickiness take a back seat. As Lutz chronicles in his entertaining and informative Chevrolet 1957 book, once upon a time design dominated the auto industry. Think of the tail fin era of the late 1950’s which gave rise to cars including the 1957 Chevrolet and the 1959 Cadillac (see images, Chevy image courtesy Trekphiler). Designers originated products. By the 1970’s, General Motors had reigned in designers, made design “part of the system,” and assigned product origination to a department called Product Planning staffed by former finance people.

    Neither the old design-driven General Motors nor the newer numbers-driven organization is a model of collaboration. In the 1960’s, when design and the designers were at their pinnacle, Lutz writes thatCadillac 1959  chief designers in well-tailored suits graced magazine covers. Essentially, designers had become stars and expected star status and treatment within GM and in society. Chief designers often silenced and sidelined people in other functions.

    When GM reduced the role of designers, the organization empowered product planning to originate products in a vacuum. Handing plans off to designers with the instruction “go design this” hardly enhances collaboration. Ideally, designers would lead a design process with input from, engineering, manufacturing, marketing, sales and dealers. In a collaborative organization, people come together across departmental and functional barriers to share ideas and develop products and services in concert.

    At least among senior leaders, GM more recently came closer to this ideal when it hatched the Chevrolet Volt, a hybrid electric/gas car introduced in December, 2010. Lutz, who had advocated an all-electric vehicle, describes how he sat across from Jon Lauckner, former GM vice president of product planning, as Lauckner sketched out the first drawing depicting the “sequential” hybrid technology of the Volt. This differs from the “parallel” hybrid technology of the Toyota Prius (The Volt is designed to go forty miles without using gasoline unlike the Prius which alternates between electric and gas). And almost immediately people Lutz dubs “unconventional thinkers” in design and product planning began collaborating.

    Whether it’s skimping on ingredients in restaurant kitchens or using inferior paint in automobile assembly plants, focusing on numbers over products and forecasting over customers reinforces the wrong organizational values. In time, team members become comfortable sacrificing products and shortchanging customers. Ultimately, value evaporates.  More collaborative organizations use quantitative analysis as a tool rather than as the primary organizational focus.